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DEEDS

-

NATURE

AND

CREATION

OF

RESERVATIONS

-

RESERVATION OF A PROPERTY INTEREST IN A DEED IN FAVOR OF THE
GRANTOR'S SPOUSE

Is

EFFECTIVE WHEN THAT

Is

THE GRANTOR'S

INTENT

Clyde Boettcher owned real estate as his separate property.'
His wife, Dorothy, joined him in executing a deed conveying the
property interest to their daughter, Loretta Malloy. 2 The deed
contained a clause in which the husband and wife reserved a life
estate in the property. 3 In an action by the grantee, Loretta, to
quiet title after the death of Clyde, the district court found that
Dorothy did not receive a life estate in the property based on the
common law rule that one cannot reserve an interest in property to
a third person who is a stranger to the title. 4 The North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed and held that Dorothy possessed a life
estate in the property since the common law prohibition against a
reservation in favor of a stranger to the title should not be allowed
to defeat Clyde's manifest intent to reserve a life estate interest for
his wife in the deed to their daughter. 5 Malloy v. Boettcher, 334
N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1983).
The common law rule that a reservation or exception 6 in a
deed of conveyance cannot operate as a conveyance to a third party
1. Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1983). Clyde Boettcher owned an undivided onethird interest in a quarter section of land. Clyde was the sole owner of this one-third interest; his wife
had no interest in the land. Id.
2. Id. Clyde and Dorothy executed a deed on May 22, 1978. Clyde died intestate on September
8, 1978. Id..
3. Id. The reservation clause in Malloy contained the following language: "RESERVING
HOWEVER, to parties of the first part a life estate in the one-third (YA) interest hereby conveyed."

Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 9.
6. See Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 552 (N.D. 1973). In considering whether there
was a material difference between the words "reservation" and "exception," the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Christman stated that "[wihile a reservation is, in effect, a regrant of the thing
reserved, an exception operates to take something out of the thing granted which would otherwise
pass. " Id.
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who is a stranger to the title or deed 7 is of feudal origins. 8 Most

jurisdictions follow the rule. 9 This rule was devised in part to
promote uniformity in the methods of conveyance by deed, which
had replaced transfers by manual livery of seisin. 10 Under the rule
7. See Stetson v. Nelson, 118 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1962). In Stetson the Norm Dakota Supreme
Court stated the common law rule as follows: "A reservation and exception purporting to be in favor
of a stranger cannot operate as a conveyance to him of the excepted interests in the land.
Id. at
688.
The common law rule prohibiting a reservation or exception in favor of a stranger is often
phrased in terms of a stranger to the deed. See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 753 (1973). But what is
logically meant is a stranger to the title. See Lemon v. Lemon, 273 Mo. 484, 496, 201 S.W. 103, 106
(1918). Questions regarding who is a stranger within the meaning of the common law rule have been
answered as follows: Those who are not parties to a deed are strangers to the deed (see Stetson v.
Nelson, 118 N.W.2d 685, 688 (N.D. 1962)); heirs of the grantor are not strangers to the deed (see
Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 280 N.Y. 43, __,
19 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1939)); public
bodies or governmental agencies are not strangers to the deed (see Dade County v. Little, 115 So. 2d
19, 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)); a spouse is not a stranger to the deed because of a spouse's
ownership of inchoate rights created by statutes (see Saunders v. Saunders, 373 I1. 302,
-, 26
N.E.2d 126, 129 (1940)).
8. See Harris, Reservations in Favor of Strangers to the Title, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 127, 131 (1953). The
commentator notes that the common law rule prohibiting reservations in favor of strangers was
originally a rule of property law dealing with the form and method employed to accomplish a transfer
of property. Id. at 132. For example, at common law A could convey a life estate to B with the
remainder in C, butA could not effect the same result by a conveyance to B with a reservation of a life
estate to C. The grantor could accomplish the transfer, but he had to do it in the formal manner
established in existing rules of property. Id.
9. See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1199 (1963). The following states observe the general rule
that in an instrument of conveyance a reservation in favor of a stranger is ineffective to create in him
a right or interest in the property: Alabama (see Jackson v. Snodgrass, 140 Ala. 365, 37 So. 246
(1904)); Arkansas (see Guaranty Loan & Trust Co. v. Helena Improvement Dist. No. 1, 148 Ark. 56,
228 S.W. 1045 (1921)); Connecticut (see School Dist. v. Lynch, 33 Conn. 330 (1866)); Florida (see
Dade County v. Little, 115 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)); Idaho (see Davis v. Gowen, 83
Idaho 204, 360 P.2d 403 (1961)); Illinois (see Saunders v. Saunders, 373 Ill. 302, 26 N.E.2d 126
(1940)); Indiana (see Olge v. Barker, 224 Ind. 489, 68 N.E.2d 550 (1946)); Iowa (see Stone v. Stone,
141 Iowa 438, 119 N.W. 712 (1909)); Maine (see Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83 (1861)); Maryland (see
Dawson v. Western Maryland R.R., 107 Md. 70, 68 A. 301 (1907)); Massachusetts (see Hodgkins v.
Bianchini, 323 Mass. 169, 80 N.E.2d 464 (1948)); Michigan (see Choals v. Plummer, 353 Mich. 6,
90 N.W.2d 851 (1958)); Mississippi (see Cook v. Farley, 195 Miss. 638, 15 So. 2d 352 (1943));
Missouri (see Schmidt v. City of Tipton, 89 S.W.2d 569 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936)); Nebraska (see Bauer
v. Bauer, 180 Neb. 177, 141 N.W.2d 837 (1966)); New York (see Lanzillotta v. Verity, 16 Misc. 2d
462, 181 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1958)); North Carolina (see In re Dixon, 156 N.C. 22, 72 S.9.
71 (1911)); Oklahoma (see Leidig v. Hoopes, 288 P.2d 402 (Okla. 1955)); Rhode Island (see Fusaro v.
Varrecchione, 51 R.I. 35, 150 A. 462 (1930)); South Carolina (see Glasgow v. Glasgow, 221 S.C.
322, 70 S.E.2d 432 (1952)); South Dakota (see Brace v. Van Eps, 21 S.D. 65, 109 N.W. 147 (1906));
Texas (see Large v. T. Mayfield, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)); Vermont (see First
Nat'l Bank v. Laperle, 117 Vt. 144, 86 A.2d 635 (1952)); Washington (see Pitman v. Sweeney, 34
Wash. App. 321, 661 P.2d 153 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983)); West Virginia (see Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 134 W. Va. 900, 62 S.E.2d 337 (1950)); Wisconsin (see Strasson v. Montgomery, 32 Wis. 52
(1873)).
The following states observe the general rule that an exception in favor of a stranger in an
instrument of conveyance is ineffective to vest any title or interest in him: Arkansas (see Rye v.
Baumann, 231 Ark. 278, 329 S.W.2d 161 (1959)); Maine (see Foxcroft v. Mallett, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
353 (1846)); Massachusetts (see Hodgkins v. Bianchini, 323 Mass. 169, 80 N.E.2d 464
(1948));Mississippi (see Wilson v. Gerard, 213 Miss. 177, 56 So. 2d 471 (1952)); Nebraska (see Bauer
v. Bauer, 180 Neb. 177, 141 N.W.2d 837 (1966)); New York (see Lanzillotta v. Verity, 16 Misc. 2d
462, 181 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1958)); North Carolina (see Redding v. Vogt, 140 N.C. 562, 53
S.E: 337 (1906)); Oklahoma (see Independent School Dist. No. 8 v. Hunter, 414 P.2d 231 (Okla.
1966)); Pennsylvania (see Ozehoski v. Scranton Spring Brook Water Serv. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 437,
43 A.2d 601 (1945)); South Carolina (see Glasgow v. Glasgow,221 S.C. 322, 70 S.E.2d 432 (1952));
Texas (see Large v. T. Mayfield, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1983)); Vermont (see Tallarico v. Brett,
137 Vt. 52, 400 A.2d 959 (1979)); West Virginia (see Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 134 W. Va.
900, 62 S.E.2d 337 (1950)).
10. Harris, supra note 8, at 132-33. The commentator suggests that the terms "reserve" and
"except" are not words of grant because they are inadequate by themselves to prove the requisite
intention to transfer title.Id.
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uniformity.1 1

the individual grantor's intent is secondary to
The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld this common law
rule in a case involving a reservation of a mineral interest to a
stranger to the deed in Stetson v. Nelson. 12 Although the court in
Stetson honored the rule, it recognized the importance of the
grantor's intent. The court found that the grantors intended to
make a reservation to the third person.13 Because the grantors did
not intend to pass the reserved interests to the grantees, the court
held that the interest remained with the grantor. 14 Prior to Malloy,
Stetson was the only case in North Dakota that addressed the validity
of an attempted reservation of a property interest in favor of a
stranger.
The modern view concerning the construction of deeds is that
the intention of the parties, as ascertained from the four corners of
the instrument, should be given effect. 15 Since the common law rule
conflicts with the modern view, courts have circumvented the rule
using a number of methods and implements. 16 When a grantor
attempts to reserve a property interest in favor of a stranger to the
title, there are three possible outcomes: the interest remains with
the grantor; the entire interest vests in the grantee; or the interest
passes to the stranger in equity. 7 California court decisions
exemplify one jurisdiction's use of various legal maneuverings to
avoid the harsh results of the common law rule and to give effect to
the grantor's intent. 8 Because the California courts have
frequently litigated the issue of an attempted reservation in favor of
a stranger, the results of the California cases will be discussed in
this Comment.
In 1860 the California Supreme Court followed the common
11. Harris, supra note 8, at 133.
12. 118 N.W.2d 685 (N.D 1962). In Stetson the grantor attempted to reserve a mineral interest
in favor of a person who was a stranger to the title of the property and to the deed. Stetson v. Nelson,
118 N.W.2d 685, 686 (N.D. 1962). He was identified in the reservation clause as "one of the parties
ofthe first part." Id. However, he was not a party to the instrument. Id. at 687.
13. Id. at 688.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g.,Malloy v. Boetteher, 334 N.W.2d 8, 9 (N.D. 1983). ("the primary purpose in
construing a deed is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the grantor"); McDonald v. Antelope
Land & Cattle Co., 294 N.W.2d 391, 393 (N.D. 1980) (in order to accurately determine the meaning
of reservation language, reference must be made to contract interpretations).
16. See Harris, supra note 8, at 133-34. Harris divides the cases upholding a reservation in favor
of a stranger into four categories. The first category treats the attempted reservation as an exception,
thus withholding the interest from the grantee. Id. at 134. Under the second category, title is passed
to the grantee but he is estopped from challenging the validity of the reservation - an equitable
charge is created against his interest. Id. The third method treats the reservation as an exception and
gives effect to the grantor's intent by treating the language as creating a trust. Id. at 135. The fourth
method permits a reservation to a spouse by subordinating the common law rule to the grantor's
intent or by creating an exception for a spouse. Id.
17. See Harris, supra note 8, at 134-35.
18. See, e.g., Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist,Pacifica, 7 Cal. 3d 473, 477, 498 P.2d
987, 990, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739, 742 (1972) (abandons the common law rule of reservations in favor of
third parties).
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law rule to avoid the interest asserted by a stranger to the deed in
Eldridge v. See Yup Co. 19 Twelve years after Eldridge, however, the
California Legislature enacted a statute which mandated that
principles of contract law were to apply to land transfers. 20 It was
not until 1972, however, in Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist,
Pacifica,2' that the California Supreme Court expressly favored
contract interpretation principles over technical rules of
22
construction and completely discarded the common law rule.
Between Eldridge and Willard, however, courts effectuated the
grantor's intent without abandoning the common law rule. 2" In
Butler v. Gosling24 the California Supreme Court treated an
attempted reservation as an exception, which prevented the grantee
from obtaining title to the property. 2 5 In Butler the court noted that
a reservation or exception will not vest title to any interest in a
stranger but may, under certain circumstances, operate as an
admission in favor of the stranger or as an estoppel against the
grantor. 26
In Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. Richvale Land Co. 27 a California
appellate court extended the principle established in Butler and.
ruled that a reservation or exception may operate as an estoppel
against the grantee. 28 A few years later the California Supreme
Court in Boyer v. Murphy2 9 again recognized the common law rule
but held that it was inapplicable in a situation involving a
19. 17 Cal. 44 (1860). In Eldridge the California Supreme Court refused LOgive effect to a clause
in the deed directing the grantee to use the land for a church. Eldridge v. See Yup Co., 17 Cal. 44, 53
(1860). The actual basis of the decision was that any restriction on the use of land by the grantee was
void. Id. at 51.
20. See CAL. CIv. CODE S 1066 (West 1982) (enacted 1872). Section 1066 states, "Grants are to
be interpreted in like manner with contracts in general, except so far as is otherwise provided in this
article." Id.
21. 7 Cal. 3d 473, 498 P.2d 987, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1972). In Willard a lot was sold subject to
an easement for automobile parking during church services. Willard v. First Church of Christ,
Scientist, Pacifica, 7 Cal. 3d 473. 475, 498 P.2d 987, 988, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739, 740 (1972).
"22. Id. at 478, 498 P.2d at 991, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 743. In its decision to abandon the common
law rule, the California Supreme Court said "[t]he rule may frustrate the grantor's intent even
though it is riddled with exceptions." Id.
23. Id.at 477, 498 P.2d at 990, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
24. 130 Cal. 422, 62 P. 596 (1900).
25. Butler v. Gosling, 130 Cal. 422, 425, 62 P. 596, 597 (1900). In Butler two wives owned a
ranch as their separate property. Id. at 424, 62 P. at 596. Their husbands joined them in conveying
the ranch to third persons, reserving a certain number of square miles of the ranch land for
themselves. Id. at 424, 62 P. at 596. The California Supreme Court ruled that even though the word
"reserving" was used, the clause was an "exception." Id. at 425, 62 P. at 597. The effect of the
ruling was to leave the title to the excepted portion precisely as it was before the instrument was
executed. Id.at 425, 62 P. at 597.
26. Id. at 426, 62 P. at 597.
27. 40 Cal. App. 451,181 P. 98(1919).
28. Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. Richvale Land Co., 40 Cal. App. 451, 457, 181 P. 98, 100 (1919).
In Sutter Butte Canal the grantees claimed that a reservation of easements was void. Id. at 455, 181 P.
at 99. The court ruled that the grantees were estopped to object to the easement because they had
consented to the reservation. Id. at 457, 181 P. at 100.
29. 202 Cal. 23, 259 P. 38(1927).
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reservation in favor of a grantor's spouse. 30 By construing the
language of the reservation as an exception, the court ruled that the
statutory provision applying contract interpretations to grants
31
mandated that the grantor's intent be given effect.
Nineteen years later a California appellate court affirmed the
common law rule because the rule's application did not conflict
with the intentions of the parties. 3 2 In Mott v. Nardo3 3 the court
found that the property owner did not intend to vest title in a
stranger; accordingly, the court needed no device to mitigate the
34
harshness of the rule.
Almost twenty years after Mott a California appellate court
upheld the reservation of a right in a stranger to the title when the
grantor reserved a right to use and occupy the land for life for
herself and her sister. 35 In Dandini v. Johnson36 the court found that
the parties intended to reserve a nonexclusive right in the grantor
and her sister for the use of the property. 37 A year later, in Smith v.
Kraintz, 38 the court of appeals held that a reservation in a stranger
of a nonexclusive easement for road purposes and public utilities
was ineffective as a reservation but was evidence of an intent to
dedicate the interest to the public. 39 Thus, the court enforced the
grantor's intent even though the reservation was invalid. 40
Finally, in 1972 the California Supreme Court in Willard v.
First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica41 laid to rest the common law
30. Boyer v. Murphy, 202 Cal. 23, 32-33, 259 P. 38, 41 (1927). The facts in Boyer were similar
to those in Malloy. In Boyer the wife was the sole owner of certain real estate. Id. at 25, 259 P. at 39.
Her husband joined with her in executing a deed conveying the fee to third persons. Id. The deed
contained a clause concluding as follows: "reserving to the parties of the first part [the wife and her
husband] the ownership and possession thereof during the lifetime of the parties of the first part and
the survivors of them." Id. The California court held that the husband possessed a life estate in the
property. Id. at 36, 259 P. at 42.
31. Id. at 29-33, 259 P. at 40-41. See supra note 20 for the statutory provision applying contract
principles to grants in California.
32. See Mott v. Nardo, 73 Cal. App. 2d 159, -, 166 P.2d 37, 39-40 (1946).
33. 73 Cal. App. 2d 159, 166 P.2d 37 (1946).
34. Mott v. Nardo, 73 Cal. App. 2d 159, __,
166 P.2d 37, 40 (1946). In Mott a bank and a
trustee jointly conveyed property to a third party. Id. at -, 166 P.2d at 39. The grantor reserved a
right of way over the land for water conduits. Id. Subsequently, the trustee conveyed the rights
reserved by him in the deed to a third party. Years later the bank conveyed the same reserved rights
to another party. Id. The court held that since the trustee was a stranger to the title, the reservation
to him was a nullity. Id. at -, 166 P.2d at 40.
35. Dandini v. Johnson, 193 Cal. App. 2d 815, 14 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1961). Dandini conveyed her
undivided one-half interest in certain property to her husband, reserving to herself and her sister the
right to use and occupy the land during the terms of their respective lives. Id. at -,
14 Cal. Rptr.
at 535.
36. 193 Cal. App. 2d 815, 14 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1961).
37. Dandini v. Johnson, 193 Cal. App. 2d 815, -,
14 Cal, Rptr. 534, 537 (1961). In
upholding the reservation to the grantor and her sister, the court in Dandinibased its decision on the
intent of the parties. Id. at
., 14 Cal. Rptr. at 536-37.
38. 201 Cal. App. 2d 696, 20 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1962).
39. Smith v.Kraintz, 201 Cal. App. 2d 696,
-, 20 Cal. Rptr. 471, 473-74(1962).
40. Id. at __,
20 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
41. 7 Cal. 3d 473, 498 P.2d 987, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1972).
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rule and followed the lead of Oregon and Kentucky. 42 In holding
that section 1066 of the California Code4 3 prevailed over the
common law rule, the California court eliminated the need to
44
circumvent the common law rule with various legal procedures.
The court further found that application of the common law rule
could potentially conflict with another California statute that
45
allowed a valid grant in any natural person.
In Malloy the North Dakota Supreme Court relied heavily on
Willard. North Dakota has a statutory provision concerning who
can receive a present interest in property. 46 This statute contains
language identical to the California statute noted in Willard. 4 7 The
North Dakota court agreed with the California Supreme Court's
interpretation that the common law rule conflicted with the
statutory provision.4 8 The court in Malloy interpreted section 47-0917 of the North Dakota Century Code to allow a property interest
to vest in a person, that the person need not be a party under a
49
grant, and words of conveyance are not necessary.
Another motivating factor behind the Malloy decision was the
42. Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 7 Cal. 3d 473, 478, 498 P.2d 987, 991,
i02 Cal. Rptr. 739, 743 (1972). The reservation in Willard was an easement allowing a parking lot
for a church. Id. at 473, 498 P.2d at 988, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 740. The California Supreme Court ruled
that the common law rule would not be permitted to defeat the grantor's intent. Id. at 479, 498 P.2d
at 991, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
Oregon abandoned the common law rule in Garza v. Grayson. See Garza v. Grayson, 255 Or. 413,
467 P.2d 960, 961-62 (1970). In Garza the reservation was an easement over land for public
-,
utility purposes benefiting a third party. Id. at-,
467 P.2d at 961. The Oregon Supreme Court in
Garza ruled that the common law prohibition against reservations in favor of strangers should not be
allowed to defeat the grantor's expressed intention. Id.
Kentucky abandoned the common law rule in Townsend v. Cable. See Townsend v. Cable, 378
S.W.2d 806, 808 ;(Ky. 1964). The court abandoned the common law rule because it was not
compatible with the rule followed in the construction of deeds - to determine the intention of the
parties as gathered from the four corners of the instrument. Id. at 808. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals in Townsend treated the reservation as a conveyance, vesting title in the stranger. Id. The
reservation was fora one-half interest in all oil and gas from a tract of land for the use and benefit of a
stranger to the deed. Id. at 806-07.
43. CAL. CiV. CODE S 1066 (West 1982). See supra note 20 for the text of § 1066.
44. See Willard, 7 Cal. 3d at 476-78, 498 P.2d at 989-91, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 741-43. The
California Supreme Court in Willard stated that grants are to be interpreted in the same way as other
contracts and not according to rigid feudal standards. Id. at 476, 498 P.2d at 989, 102 Cal. Rptr. at
741.
45. Id. at 477, 498 P.2d at 990, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 742. Section 1085 of the California Civil Code
provides, "A present interest, and the benefit of a condition or covenant respecting property, may be
taken by any natural person under a grant, although not named a party thereto." CAL. Civ. CODE
§1085 (West 1982) (enacted 1872). The court in Willard noted that the provision had never been
used in any California case and would not apply in Willardbecause the church was a corporation and
not a natural person. Willard, 7 Cal. 3d at 477, n.3, 498 P.2d at 990, n.3, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 742, n.3.
46. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 47-09-17 (1978). Section 47-09-17 states, "A present interest and the
benefit of a condition or covenant respecting property may be taken by any natural person under a
grant although not named a party thereto." Id.
47. Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d at 10. For the text of § 1085 of the California Civil Code,
see supra note 45. The punctuation in 5 47-09-17 is not the same as California's § 1085; California's
provision contains commas while North Dakota's provision has no punctuation.
48. 334 N.W.2d at 10.
49. Id. The court stated that § 47-09-17 permits "a natural person to receive a present interest in
property even though that person is not named through words of conveyance as a party under the
grant." Id.

19841

CASE COMMENT

court's willingness to effectuate the grantor's intent.5 0 The Stetson
case, which followed the common law rule, was overruled to the
extent it was contrary to Malloy.5 1 The Malloy court said that
language in the reservation clause that identified the husband and
wife as "parties of the first part" receiving a life estate expressed
the husband's intention that his wife would possess a life estate in
52
the property after his death.
Since the reservation clause in Malloy involved a husband and
wife, a reservation in favor of a spouse in North Dakota will operate
as a conveyance of a property interest to the spouse when that is the
grantor's intent. 53 Whether the same result would occur if a true
stranger to the title were involved, however, is unclear.
Three of the justices filed special concurrences because they
felt that a wife is not a stranger to the title. 54 Justice VandeWalle
felt that Stetson should not be overruled until a case involving a true
stranger to the title is before the court. 55 Justice Pederson
concluded that the court might want to apply the common law rule
upheld in Stetson when a case involves a real stranger. 5 6 Justice Sand
reasoned that Stetson does not apply to the Malloy case because
Stetson involved a stranger to the deed whereas Malloy involved a
spouse who had joined in the deed and was, therefore, not a
57
stranger to the deed.
A reservation in a deed to the grantor's spouse will be a valid
method of property conveyance in North Dakota when courts
50. See id. at 9-10. The court in Malloy did not rule that S 47-09-11 of the North Dakota Century
Code was controlling as California had ruled regarding S 1066 in Willard. See supra note 20. Section
47-09-11 of the North Dakota Century Code states in par, "Grants shall be interpreted in like
N.D.
manner with contracts in ,eneral except so far as otherwise provided by this chapter ....
CENT. CODE S 47-09-11 (1978).
51. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 10. The Stetson case was not completely overruled by Malloy. Id. If a
reservation is ineffective to convey a property interest to a third person who is a stranger to the deed
or title, the reserved or excepted interest remains in the grantor and does not pass to the grantee. See
Stetson v. Nelson, 118 N.W.2d 685, 688 (N.D. 1962).
Justice Pederson, concurring specially in Malloy, felt that Stetson should be overruled to the
extent that it operates to defeat attempted reservations to a husband and wife in a deed signed by
both parties. 334 N.W.2d at 11 (Pederson, J., concurring). Justice Pederson stated that a wife is a
necessary party to a property transaction because of her legal interests in her husband's property and
is, therefore, notsstranger within the meaning of the common law rule. Id.
52. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 10.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 10-12.
55. Id. at 11 (VandeWalle, J., concurring). Justice VandeWalle viewed the issue in Malloy as
merely whether a wife is a stranger. Id. He said the larger issue involving a true stranger was neither
raised nor briefed. Id.
56. Id. (Pederson,J., concurring).
57. Id. (Sand, J., concurring). Justice Sand stated that the common law rule upheld in Stetson
was abandoned in North Dakota when the legislature enacted S 47-09-17 of the North Dakota
Century Code. Justice Sand reasoned that S 1-01-06 accomplished that result. Id. at 11-12. See supra
note 46 for the text of § 47-09-17. Section 1-01-06 of the North Dakota Century Code provides,
"In this state there is no common law in any cases where the law is declared by the code." N.D.
CENT. CODE S 1-01-06 (1975).
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determine that this is the grantor's intent. Consequently, questions
will arise concerning the sufficiency of the language necessary to
establish this intent. 8 A consequence of the Malloy decision is that
in North Dakota, the words "parties of the first part" in a deed
may be considered a sufficient manifestation of the intention
59
necessary to vest title in the spouse.
Another consequence of the Malloy decision is that courts may
60
uphold exceptions as well as reservations in favor of a spouse.
Finally, North Dakota may apply this holding to uphold a
reservation of other property rights and interests such as easements
and mineral rights to a spouse. 61 If a case involving a
true stranger is presented to the North Dakota Supreme Court and

the court holds that the Malloy decision extends to those who are not
spouses, the same questions and consequences will apply to the
stranger.
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58. See Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 10. The language used to reserve or except an interest must
clearly show an intention to reserve or except from the grant and not from some other provision in the,
deed such as the warranty clause. See Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D. 1983) (language
used to reserve or except a mineral interest to the vendor was located within the warranty clause,
indicating an intention to except the interest from the warranty rather than an intention to except the
interest from the grant so that the deed did not except or reserve to the heirs of the vendor any
minerals or mineral rights).
59. See Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 10. The opinion is not clear whether the words "parties of the
first part" were sufficient in Malloy because the parties were husband and wife or if the words would
be a sufficient manifestation of intent no matter what the relationship would be between those named
as parties to the grant.
60. Id. at 9. In Malloy the common law rule was replaced with the rule that "a reservation or
exception can be effective to convey a property interest to a third party who is a stranger to the deed or
title of the property where that is determined to have been the grantor's intent." Id. (emphasis
added).
61. Id. at 10. The court, stated that it was following the lead of California, Oregon, and
Kentucky. Id. The California case involved an easement. See Willard, 7 Cal. 3d at 475, 498 P.2d at
988, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 740. The Oregon case also involved an easement. See Garza v. Grayson, 255
Or. at -, 467 P.2d at 961. The Kentucky case involved mineral rights. See Townsend v. Cable,
378 S.W.2d at 807.

